Soft Power: Middle East 2017
by
Savanah Dickinson

Undergraduate honors thesis under the direction of
Dr. Touria Khannous
Department of Foreign Languages & Literatures

Submitted to the LSU Roger Hadfield Ogden Honors
College in partial fulfillment of the Upper Division
Honors Program.

November 2017

Louisiana State University & Agricultural and Mechanical College
Baton Rouge, Louisiana

Soft Power: Middle East

2017

Author

Savanah Dickinson

www.savanahdickinson.com

Twitter @SavDickinson

Savanah graduated from Louisiana State University in December 2017 with a bachelor's degree in mass communication and another in international studies. She also minored in Arabic and political science. She graduated *summa cum laude* and with College Honors from the Roger Hadfield Ogden Honors College. During her four years at LSU, she studied abroad in Morocco, covered the political beat for The Daily Reveille and was a member of the LSU Media Board. She served as a student senator, president of the undergraduate mock trial team, a liaison between the U.S. Department of State and the university, and a Zeta Tau Alpha academic mentor. She interned with American Way and Celebrated Living magazines as an editorial assistant, the U.S. Department of State in D.C. in the Bureau of International Information Programs and in the Public Affairs Section of the U.S. Embassy Manama, Bahrain, and AARP Louisiana as the advocacy and communication intern. She earned distinctions as an LSU Distinguished Communicator and a Margaret Dixon Outstanding Female Mass Communication Senior.

Content

Executive Summary

There are two forms of globalization: the condition of globalization and the process of globalization. The **condition of globalization** is the present state of globalization, the actions it allows and the things it produces. People can see and touch the condition of globalization. The condition embodies the interconnectedness of mankind. Because of the condition of globalization, a person in Bahrain can order a California-designed item manufactured in China from Amazon and expect it on his or her doorstep within two days. The **process of globalization** is the evolution of globalization over time. The process is how people experience globalization. Globalization has evolved throughout all of human history. Certain time periods saw globalization booms that greatly accelerated human development in science, politics, religion and culture. The developments of globalization build on each other, propelling society forward. The Enlightenment built on the ideas of the Renaissance. The Renaissance built on the ideas of the Roman Empire and the Ancient Greeks. The Iron Age built on the ideas of the Bronze Age, and the Bronze Age built on the ideas of the Stone Age.[1] The digital revolution currently builds on the ideas of the industrial revolution. The digital revolution is intimately tied to soft power. The digitization of politics, economic cooperation and culture allows for easy dissemination around the world. The digital age not only encourages a shift towards soft power but also makes the shift easier than ever before. Middle Eastern states have the potential to rebalance their power structure in favor of soft power. A well-balanced power structure can better combat extremism, terrorism, the refugee crisis and improve the overall image of the Middle East.

Academics and professionals often overlook soft power held by Middle Eastern states. Regional instability and conflict can cause people to believe these states only care for hard power. The Soft Power: Middle East (SPME) ranking focuses on the Middle

1	Israel
2	United Arab Emirates
3	Turkey
4	Qatar
5	Cyprus*
6	Saudi Arabia
7	Morocco
8	Tunisia*
9	Bahrain
10	Kuwait

*Excluded from one sub-index

East in an effort to uncover the region's soft power-heavy states and the region's strengths and weaknesses in terms of soft power. Based on my research, no other soft power ranking includes all of the Middle East or looks at the region specifically.

Results

Israel tops the overall SPME ranking. Israel ranks first in three of the six sub-indexes: education, government and enterprise. The United Arab Emirates ranks first in the digital sub-index alone but ranks among the top four states in engagement, enterprise and education. Turkey takes the top spots in culture and engagement and follows closely behind Israel in education. Turkey's soft power swelled in the early 2000s, but events of the last few years have caused a rapid decline in soft power. I explore Turkey's rise and fall in greater detail on page 16.

Structure

SPME looks at over 50 metrics divided into six sub-indexes of soft power: culture, government, education, enterprise, engagement and digital. The states are ranked within each metric. These metrics determine the state's ranking within that sub-index. The state's rankings in all six sub-indexes are averaged to determine its overall soft power ranking. The data for each state can be found on page 28.

Introduction

"Power is one's ability to affect the behavior of others to get what one wants."
      -Joseph Nye

Power

One can affect the behavior of others through coercion, payment and attraction. Soft power, a term coined by Joseph Nye, uses attraction to obtain a particular outcome. Hard power uses coercion and payment. Instead of using the hard power method of carrot and stick, the efficient use of soft power allows a state to set the agenda and shape the preferences of other states. States cannot effectively rely on one kind of power alone. States must balance hard and soft power for what Nye calls "smart power." Hard or soft power alone cannot produce effective foreign policy.[2] A globalized world where time seems to move faster and the world seems to shrink has brought more attention to soft power and the benefits of its utilization. Soft power's cost effectiveness and ability to bring together international partners to achieve global outcomes makes it increasingly attractive.[3]

A state's soft power relies on its culture, policies and values. These three components aid the development of resources that produce a state's soft power. Soft power is measured in terms of behavioral outcome, or attractive power, and the resources that produce attraction.[4]

To possess soft power, a state must demonstrate legitimacy. Liberalism emphasizes the need for countries to appear legitimate through participation in global affairs and cooperation with the international community. According to Nye, a state can acquire this legitimacy from three sources.

Legitimacy comes from values of the power-holder; a state's political, social, economic and cultural institutions; and the methods in which foreign policy are executed. The international community tends to prefer power-holders who demonstrate democratic ideals and govern fairly according to international standards. If fellow members of the global community view a state's political, social, economic and cultural institutions as contributing to social and economic welfare, they will likely find that state's foreign policy legitimate. The global community typically disapproves of unilateral foreign policy actions. Cooperation with international organizations and compliance with international law increase a state's soft power.[5]

Other soft power rankings

Jonathan McClory, a partner at Portland, determines a country's soft power according to six sub-indexes, further specifying Nye's three categories of culture, policies and values. "The Soft Power 30: A Global Ranking of Soft Power" figures a country's soft power using the sub-indexes of culture, government, education, engagement, enterprise and digital. In addition to these sub-indexes, McClory also uses international polling in the development of his soft power ranking. Portland utilizes 75 metrics including international tourism, number of United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage Sites, number of mobile phones per 100 people, internet bandwidth, educational enrollment rate, number of

diplomatic cultural missions, World Economic Forum Competitiveness Index score, Human Development Index score and many more.[3]

Where is the Middle East?

I base my research on the structure developed by McClory, but I specifically look to the Middle East and North Africa instead of focusing on 60 countries around the globe as McClory and his Portland team did in 2016.[3] This ranking of MENA states according to their soft power is based on a broad definition of the region. Daniel Lerner wrote, "The people of the area today are unified not by their common solutions but by their common problems."[6] There's an element of truth to Lerner's judgment of the Middle East. The geographical definition of the Middle East evolves depending on the country in crisis and the outside powers addressing the crisis.[7] I use the term Middle East as a convenience for the purpose of this study. However, I understand the geographical lines of the Middle East are arbitrarily defined and therefore my usage of the term to describe these countries may become outdated.

According to my broad definition, I analyze the soft power of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Turkey, Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Cyprus, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and Yemen. I divide my findings according to the six sub-indexes of culture, government, education, enterprise, engagement and digital. The overall soft power ranking of these Middle Eastern countries is based on their rankings within the six sub-indexes of soft power.

Rarity

Any mention of the Middle East in conversations of soft power is rare. People tend to think of the Middle East in terms of hard power, most notably in the form of foreign military involvement. Academics and foreign policy gurus often speak of soft power in the Middle East in terms of outside powers flexing their soft power muscles in the region. Rarely is there a discussion of the soft power utilized by Middle Eastern states.

Turkey is often identified as the token Middle Eastern country with a high level of soft power. As my ranking and further analysis of Turkey's soft power shows, Turkey is no longer the soft power heavyweight in the Middle East.

This ranking takes a magnifying glass to a region largely underrepresented on global rankings of soft power. It is unfair to the development of soft power in the Middle East to compare these states to those of France, the United Kingdom and the United States. This ranking of the soft power of Middle Eastern states fosters competition within the region. One can better determine the areas in which the states of this region need to improve by comparing Middle Eastern states to one another and by looking at the six sub-indexes instead of a state's soft power as a whole.

Challenges and limitations

While conducting my research, I repeatedly ran into missing or outdated data. Libya and Iraq most frequently fell victim to these data blackouts. The more unstable the state, the less data there is available to determine the state's soft power. Because of primary sources' inability to gather this data, one can assume the infrastructure is not in place within that state to promote soft power. Therefore, these states would rank lower on that scale. I exclude these states from the rankings due to insufficient data. I chose to include the most recent data available. In some instances, this data dates back to 2013. I exclude all older data even if it means that state is missing a metric. I would be doing the report a disservice if I used outdated data. The conditions for soft power change too frequently. Relying on old data would skew the rankings likely in favor of that state.

While missing data largely applies to individual states, the education sub-index experiences the greatest number of data blackouts. There is a lack of education data available across the region. Nearly every state in the education sub-index lacks one or more data points. I attribute this lack of data to insufficient education systems in much of the Middle East. In 2015, nearly 4.5 million children were not in school in the Arab world, according to the World Economic Forum. About 87 percent of those children lived in conflict-affected countries. An additional 2.9 million children did not have access to secondary schools. Continuing regional conflict and a crippling refugee crisis reinforce the education gap affecting the Middle East.[8] The lack of education infrastructure does not allow for the proper retrieval of data by primary sources like the World Bank. A lack of data makes it difficult to properly judge the status of education in a state.

The division of countries according to soft power can be compared to collegiate sporting divisions. The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) classifies athletic programs according to three divisions. Division I programs include the biggest schools with plenty of money to spend on athletic programs. These Division I schools can award hefty athletic scholarships to its athletes. Division II programs are typically smaller than Division I schools and spend less on their athletics and athletic scholarships. Division III programs are usually small schools where athletics are not a priority and the disbursement of athletic scholarships is not allowed. France, the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany and other high ranking soft power states would be considered Division I soft powers. Developed states not considered vital global influencers would be Division II soft powers. Developing states would be Division III soft powers. For the most part, Middle Eastern states would be classified as Division III because they do not have the resources to allocate to the development of soft power based on their current structure of power. If given the opportunity to be a Division I athletic program, schools would quickly jump at the opportunity. States are no different. If given the opportunity to be a Division I soft power, states would take the chance to obtain more power. Just as it would be unfair to match a Division III school against a Division I school, it is unreasonable to compare Division III soft powers to the likes of France, the U.K. and the U.S.

2017 SPME Ranking

1

Israel

2.00

2

United Arab Emirates

3.67

3

Turkey

4.00

4

Qatar

4.83

5

Cyprus*

6.40

6

Saudi Arabia

7.00

7

Morocco

7.33

8

Tunisia*

8.80

9

Bahrain

9.17

10

Kuwait

9.83

11

Egypt

10.17

12

Lebanon

10.50

13	**14**	**14**
Iran	Jordan	Oman
10.83	11.00	11.00
15	**16**	**17**
Algeria*	Pakistan*	Yemen*
12.60	16.00	18.20

Excluded:
Afghanistan
Iraq
Libya
Palestine
Syria

*Excluded from one sub-index ranking

2017 SPME Ranking Analysis

The top five SPME states did not experience Arab Spring uprisings. However, this does not mean they were spared from the rippling effects of what some prefer to call the Arab Tsunami.[9] For the most part, the overall SPME ranking demonstrates the correlation between stability and soft power. For a state to properly invest in its own soft power, there must be stability in the government. States with greater stability possess greater soft power and are therefore ranked higher. A number of states within the Middle East lack stability due to civil wars, terrorist activity or mishandling of the refugee crisis. For these reasons, Middle Eastern states do not find themselves ranked well in studies such as McClory's "The Soft Power 30." If the region as a whole develops a better balance of hard and soft power, states could address regional issues and improve outside opinions of the Middle East. Middle Eastern states would no longer have to rely so heavily on outside powers like the United States and the United Kingdom which use both hard and soft power in the region. By exhibiting greater soft power on the international stage, these Middle Eastern states can begin to change the stigma placed on the Middle East, Arabs and Muslims.

North African countries failed to break into the top five SPME spots. Instead, Mediterranean and Gulf states dominate these top spots. No North African country ranked first in any sub-index.

Portland's McClory ranked Israel two places above Turkey in the inaugural "Soft Power 30" ranking in 2015. Israel has not broken the top 30 since 2015. Turkey also fell out of the ranking in 2016 but reemerged in 2017 in thirtieth place.[10] The SPME ranking does not reflect this trend. Israel firmly holds the first-place spot for 2017 with Turkey trailing in third place. I expect to see Turkey continue to fall in soft power rankings as President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan continues to show preference for hard power as he tightens his grip on his country. I explore Turkey's rise and fall in soft power in detail on page 16.

In every sub-index outside of culture, Israel takes either first or second place. Israel's greatest weakness appears to be its cultural soft power output. A lack of tourism to Israel significantly hinders the country's cultural soft power. Israel falls behind five other Middle Eastern states on the World Economic Forum's Travel and Tourism Competitiveness Index Ranking for 2017, placing it sixty-first in the world. Security, risk of terrorism and limited openness hold Israel back on the World Economic Forum's ranking.[11] Israel's continued struggles with its neighbors tarnish its appeal to international tourists.

The UAE proves to be strong in the digital and enterprise sub-indexes. The UAE is quickly becoming not only a regional but a global business hub. The World Economic Forum ranks the UAE seventeenth in the world on its Global Competitiveness Index for 2017-2018. The UAE ranks twenty-sixth in the world for ease of doing business according to the World Bank. The next highest ranking Middle Eastern country is Cyprus at number 45.[12] The UAE's growing digital capacities aid its enterprise. A favorable business environment and top-of-the-line digital resources make the UAE one of the most soft power rich countries in the Middle East.

There is no direct correlation between a state's gross domestic product (GDP) and its ranking in soft power in the region. For example, Cyprus has the lowest GDP in the region (U.S. $19,801,664,170) but possesses the fifth most soft power. Israel and the UAE both have less than half the GDP of Turkey, yet they out-rank Turkey in soft power. Saudi Arabia has the financial means to increase its soft power as it ranks second in GDP in the region but sixth in overall soft power. Pakistan ranks comparatively better in GDP (#7) than soft power (#16). This lack of a relationship indicates a state's soft power does not rely on a state's wealth.

GDP (current US$/thousand) World Bank 2016 unless noted otherwise	SPME Ranking
Turkey 857,748,989.29	Israel 1
Saudi Arabia 646,438,380.57	United Arab Emirates 2
Iran 393,436,064.44 (2015)	Turkey 3
United Arab Emirates 348,743,265.72	Qatar 4
Egypt 336,296,921.76	Cyprus 5
Israel 318,743,685.88	Saudi Arabia 6
Pakistan 283,659,980.70	Morocco 7
Algeria 156,079,606.66	Tunisia 8
Qatar 152,468,681.32	Bahrain 9
Kuwait 114,041,209.70	Kuwait 10
Morocco 101,445,004.81	Egypt 11
Oman 66,293,368.01	Lebanon 12
Lebanon 47,536,798.65	Iran 13
Tunisia 42,062,549.39	Jordan 14
Jordan 38,654,727.75	Oman 14
Bahrain 31,858,510.64	Algeria 15
Yemen 27,317,605.35	Pakistan 16
Cyprus 19,801,664.17	Yemen 17

Culture

The global reach of a state's cultural products demonstrates the attractiveness of that state's people and way of life. The SPME takes into account tourism, films featured in the top five international film festivals, UNESCO World Heritage sites, power of the language spoken by the majority of a state's population, Olympic medals won, the state's men's Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) ranking and the quality of the national air carrier.

Turkey leads the Middle East in the culture sub-index with rankings in the top three spots in every metric except the number of films featured in international film festivals. Turkey's geographic location makes it a hub of tourism from the east and west. In 2015, Turkey welcomed nearly 40 million tourists who spent over US $35 billion.[13]

Qatar possesses great potential for upward mobility in the culture sub-index. Qatar is home to the highest ranked national air carrier in the region and produces the most films featured in international film festivals compared to its neighbors. Low tourism and the designation of only one UNESCO World Heritage site currently hold Qatar back. Despite being ranked eleventh for number of tourists, those who travel to Qatar spend the second most in the region. If Qatar could increase the number of incoming tourists, it would likely overtake Iran, Morocco and Egypt.

How does the number of Olympic medals a state wins indicate soft power? The capacity to fund and train an Olympic team demonstrates a state's willingness and ability to be a major player on the international stage. Participation in the Olympics also provides valuable air time for states and their athletic representatives.

1 Turkey - 2.67

2 Egypt - 4.44

2 Morocco - 4.44

3 Iran - 4.78

3 Qatar - 4.78

4 Saudi Arabia - 5.11

5 Israel - 5.33

6 United Arab Emirates*- 5.71

7 Tunisia - 6.22

8 Bahrain - 7.33

9 Jordan - 7.67

10 Lebanon - 8.00

11 Algeria - 8.11

12 Oman - 8.55

13 Cyprus* - 8.75

14 Palestine* - 9.00

15 Kuwait - 10.00

16 Yemen* - 10.63

17 Pakistan* - 10.75

*one or two missing metrics

Excluded:
Afghanistan
Iraq
Libya
Syria

Government

The government sub-index highlights a state's ideals as well as a state's ability to better itself. The SPME considers freedoms, the number of government sanctioned executions, gender gap, the level of democracy, human development, the number of think tanks and government effectiveness.

Israel ranks among the top two states in every government sub-index metric. In no other sub-index does a state rank so well. Israel's soft power is significantly aided by its governance. Israel's democratic political structure allows the government to garner soft power not only within the government sub-index but across the various soft power sub-indexes.

Although Iran ranks among the bottom tier of states in the government sub-index, Iran hosts the greatest number of think tanks in the Middle East. As of 2015, Iran was home to 59 think tanks.[14] Egypt, another poorly ranked country in the government sub-index, hosts the third highest number of think tanks in the region. Iraq has the fifth highest number of think tanks with Palestine and Yemen not far behind. Each of these states ranks in the bottom tier of the government sub-index. Think tanks act as a catalyst for ideas and the development of government policy. Think tanks package the public's ideas for the government to use in the creation of policy.[15] One would assume that states with a significant number of think tanks would also hold a significant amount of soft power due to cohesiveness between the public and private sectors, the citizenry and the government. Yet, the SPME's government sub-index does not support this assumption. There appears to be no correlation between the number of think tanks and the amount of governmental soft power a state possesses.

1	Israel	- 1.45
2	Cyprus	- 3.18
3	Tunisia	- 7.18
4	Turkey	- 7.27
5	Qatar	- 7.36
6	United Arab Emirates	- 7.45
7	Kuwait	- 8.36
8	Lebanon	- 8.64
9	Jordan	- 8.82
10	Morocco	- 9.55
10	Oman	- 9.55
11	Palestine*	- 10.80
12	Algeria	- 11.00
13	Bahrain	- 11.09
14	Pakistan	- 12.09
15	Egypt	- 12.55
16	Iraq*	- 13.20
17	Saudi Arabia	- 13.36
18	Iran	- 13.73
19	Afghanistan*	- 14.90
20	Yemen*	- 18.60
21	Libya*	- 19.11
22	Syria*	- 20.70

*one or two missing metrics

Education

An educated population seeks knowledge and collaboration outside its state's borders. These educated individuals pursue the exchange of knowledge not only within their state, but also with intellectuals around the globe. Soft power through education requires a structured, effective elementary education system. Secondary and tertiary education systems cannot be built on a weak elementary education structure. High levels of wealth, gender inequalities and conflict prevent youth from earning an education. These inequalities and conflict limit the state's ability to gain soft power through education. Education not only provides valuable skills like critical thinking and communication, but it also instills hope in the youth population.[8]

As previously mentioned, the education sub-index proved the most challenging when gathering data. There is a lack of data across the region in the field of education. Nearly half the states of the Middle East lack sufficient data to reliably rank them. The SPME considers the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study math and science scores for eighth graders, gross tertiary enrollment ratio for both sexes, international ranking of the state's best university, number of academic science journal articles published, number of inbound internationally mobile students and the government's expenditure on education as a percentage of its GDP.

Israel ranks in the top three spots of every education metric except in the metric for the number inbound internationally mobile students. Israel ranked in the bottom third with 10,471 inbound international students in 2014. In contrast, the UAE saw 73,445 inbound international students in 2015.[16]

1	Israel - 3.00
2	Turkey - 3.29
3	United Arab Emirates* - 4.20
4	Iran - 6.00
5	Saudi Arabia* - 6.17
6	Lebanon - 7.86
7	Egypt* - 8.00
8	Qatar - 8.71
9	Bahrain - 9.43
10	Jordan* - 10.00
10	Oman* - 10.00
11	Morocco* - 11.33
12	Kuwait* - 12.40

*one or two missing metrics

Excluded:
Afghanistan
Algeria
Cyprus
Iraq
Libya
Pakistan
Palestine
Syria
Tunisia
Yemen

Enterprise

Enterprise embodies more than a state's economic ability. A state's enterprise exemplifies its ingenuity and willingness to pursue an adaptive and interactive economy. A state's ability to foster competition and attract foreign investors speaks to its soft power. The SPME considers a state's competitiveness, economic freedom, corruption, foreign direct investment inflows and outflows, innovation, research and development expenditure, ease of doing business, unemployment rate, hi-tech exports, cost to start a new business and human capital.

Despite poor rankings in nearly every enterprise metric, Iran offers the lowest business startup costs as a percentage of GNI per capita. The nuclear deal opened the doors to Iran's $400 billion economy. *Fortune*'s Vivienne Walt calls the surge in foreign investment Iran's Startup Spring.[17] This influx of investment and Iran's international economic involvement will likely increase Iran's soft power over time. However, President Trump's decertification of the deal in October 2017 could cause foreign investors to hesitate. The United States' next step will determine the livelihood of Iran's Startup Spring.

1 Israel - 2.58

2 United Arab Emirates - 3.92

3 Cyprus - 5.33

4 Qatar* - 5.64

5 Bahrain - 6.92

6 Saudi Arabia - 7.67

7 Turkey - 8.33

8 Morocco* - 9.36

9 Kuwait - 9.42

10 Oman* - 9.91

11 Tunisia - 9.92

12 Jordan* - 10.91

13 Lebanon* - 11.60

14 Iran* - 11.70

15 Egypt - 11.92

16 Pakistan - 13.92

17 Algeria* - 14.36

18 Yemen* - 16.64

*one or two missing metrics

Excluded:
Afghanistan
Iraq
Libya
Palestine
Syria

Engagement

The more engaged a state is with the rest of the world, the greater its soft power. The engagement sub-index looks at a state's diplomatic reach and involvement abroad. It also takes into consideration the involvement of other states within its borders. The SPME considers the amount of development assistance and official aid received by a state, number of embassies abroad and within a state's capital, number of consulates abroad, participation in international organizations, ratification of the Paris Agreement, number of refugees from that state and number of countries a citizen can visit visa-free.

Despite being ranked the highest in terms of engagement, Turkey receives a considerable amount of official development assistance and official aid. In 2015, Turkey received U.S. $2 billion in assistance and aid, the sixth most in the region.[18]

Active participation in international organizations and willingness to create a better future for citizens of the international community demonstrate a state's soft power. Every state in the Middle East has signed the Paris Agreement, most recently Syria. The majority of states in the region have ratified and enacted the Paris Agreement. Every signatory agrees to work to limit global temperature rise to less than two degrees Celsius but aim for no greater increase than 1.5 degrees Celsius.[19]

1	Turkey - 4.63
2	Israel* - 6.29
3	Morocco - 6.50
4	United Arab Emirates* - 6.57
5	Qatar* - 6.86
5	Saudi Arabia* - 6.86
6	Egypt - 7.13
7	Algeria - 7.25
8	Cyprus* - 7.29
9	Kuwait* - 7.71
10	Tunisia - 8.00
11	Iran - 8.63
12	Jordan - 9.38
13	Libya - 9.88
14	Lebanon - 10.00
15	Pakistan - 10.38
16	Oman* - 10.57
17	Bahrain* - 12.00
18	Yemen - 12.38
19	Iraq - 13.38
20	Syria - 13.75
21	Palestine* - 14.00
22	Afghanistan - 15.63

*one or two missing metrics

Digital

In a technology driven age, states must be digitally connected and engaged with the rest of the world. Connectivity allows the dissemination of information across borders. The internet opens border crossings for the cyber community. The SPME considers the percentage of individuals using the internet in a state, number of secure internet servers, number of cellphone subscriptions, internet bandwidth, fixed broadband subscriptions, E-Government Development Index score and E-Participation Index score.

The UAE's budding tech hub, Dubai, encourages technological advancement and connectivity to foreign markets. Greater connectivity and technological resources also invites enterprise. The UAE falls just short of the number one spot in enterprise. As Dubai increasingly becomes an incubator for startups in the Middle East, the UAE will likely overcome Israel for the number one spot in the enterprise sub-index.

In every metric but one, Morocco ranked in the middle of the pack. Yet, Morocco tied with Israel in the E-Participation Index for the number one spot. The E-Participation Index measures online services that facilitate information flow from the government to the citizenry, interaction with stakeholders and citizen engagement in decision-making processes.[20] Following the Arab Spring, the *makhzen* (Morocco's ruling elite) undertook reforms to appease the population.[21] Morocco's impressive E-Participation Index score likely finds its roots in the government's action following the Arab Spring uprisings.

1   United Arab Emirates - 2.57

2   Israel - 3.14

3   Bahrain - 3.86

4   Qatar - 5.43

5   Saudi Arabia - 6.00

6   Cyprus - 6.14

7   Kuwait - 6.57

8   Oman - 7.29

9   Turkey - 8.71

10   Morocco - 8.78

11   Palestine* - 9.43

12   Lebanon - 9.71

13   Tunisia - 10.57

14   Jordan - 11.14

15   Iran - 13.86

16   Egypt - 14.57

16   Algeria - 14.57

17   Syria - 17.43

18   Pakistan - 18.00

19   Afghanistan - 19.00

19   Yemen - 19.00

*one or two missing metrics

Excluded:
Iraq
Libya

Turkey's Fall
The Decline of Turkey's Soft Power

Turkey welcomed an age of soft power beginning in the early 2000s with economic success, high levels of tourism, international engagement, cultural dispersion and integration into European affairs. Yet, recent events caused Turkey's government to shift away from soft power and towards hard power. In the last two years, Turkey saw hundreds die in attacks attributed to Kurdish and Islamic State militants.[22] A military coup attempted to overthrow the government in July 2016.[23] Millions of Syrian immigrants fled their country and sought refuge in Turkey, overwhelming the country's infrastructure.[24] President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan expanded his powers through a national referendum, providing him with greater power.[25] Turkish authorities silence opposition groups including political figures, the media and nongovernmental organizations.[22] Events such as these demonstrate Turkey's sharp turn away from soft power. The international community can expect to see Turkey's further fall in soft power in the coming years.

History

Turkey is uniquely situated at a crossroad of continents and cultures.[26] It connects East and West, North and South, Islamic and non-Islamic, Europe and Asia, Middle East and Europe, and the Middle East and Asia.[27] Turkey's cultural reach stems from its Ottoman-Turkish heritage. The Ottoman Empire once included Africa, Asia, the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus and parts of Europe.[28]

Modern Turkey emerged in 1923 out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire.[23] The Republic of Turkey's founding leader, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, molded the country based on two pillars: nationalism and secularism. Atatürk's ideological legacy has become known as "Kemalism."[29] Atatürk's vision for Turkey included a strong military, acting as "the guardian of its [Turkey's] ideals."[30] Atatürk intended for the Turkish military to do more than defend the country's external frontiers; he meant it to be the power base for the country.[30] Since 1960, the military forced out four civilian governments. Following each military coup, the military returned political power to civilians.[23]

Many believe Turkey has entered a post-Kemalist phase led by the Justice and Development Party (AKP), voted into power in 2002. The AKP-led government's acknowledgment of the existence of the Kurds and allowance of "religious symbols" in public life showcase Turkey's shift away from Kemalism.[29] Fearful of the military as a potential adversary, the AKP-led Turkish government reduced the military's power in an effort to counter repeats of the 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997 coup d'états.[31]

Turkey's primary concern since becoming a republic in 1923 has been its security, ensuring that the state remains in existence. Until the early 2000s, Turkey continued to demonstrate its preference for hard power as it experienced internal security threats rooted in the rise of political Islam and ethnic Kurdish separatism. Those in power within Turkey soon realized that Turkey must be recognized as a Western state to maintain its security. This recognition was only possible by increasing its soft power.[5]

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, a member of the AKP, took the office of prime minister in 2003.[32] He promised a "new social contract" between the state and society that would usher in liberal reforms. These reforms were meant to enhance the separation of powers, freedom of the press, the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary.[33] As prime minister, Erdoğan appeared to be leading Turkey into the age of soft power. However, he stepped down from his role as prime minister in 2014 when AKP rules prevented him from seeking another term. Instead of leaving political life, Erdoğan remained in the spotlight and ran for the largely ceremonial office of the president where he currently sits.[32] Although Erdoğan initially promised economic, political and social liberalization in his role as prime minister, as president he moves the country towards authoritarianism, consolidating more power for himself.[33]

Turkey's Rise

To better understand Turkey's fall in soft power, one must first understand Turkey's rise in soft power beginning in the early 2000s. The influence of internal and external factors and instruments used by Turkish policymakers attribute to this rise. The internal factors that allowed for Turkey's rise in soft power include its political structure, leadership and desecuritisation, namely looking at issues previously seen as matters of security as political issues instead.[5] Alternatively, the external factors that aided Turkey's soft power include the pressures of globalization facilitated by the West and cooperation with international organizations. Turkish policymakers utilized a number of instruments to aid the country's soft power: engagement with all political actors, support of democratic processes, expansion of economic integration and an increase in sociocultural relations and communication.[28]

Internal factors

Turkey's unique religious and political model makes it appear to have great soft power when compared to its neighbors in the Middle East.[34] Islam in Turkey is mainly cultural and not ideological or political. Turkey successfully established a secular government, putting the state above religion beginning in 1923. No other Middle Eastern country structures its government this way. Each allows religion to heavily influence national interests.[5] Turkey exemplified a model country combining Islam, democracy and neoliberal economics. Its ability to be politically stable and expand its economy made it the poster child of the Middle East in the eyes of the West.[34] Liberal and moderate Islamists saw Turkey's secular model as a way to combat radical

Islam. Radical Islam dictates that Islam and the democratic norms of the Western world are incompatible. Liberal and moderate Islamists pinned their hopes on Turkey to counter the radical Islamists' argument.[5]

Turkey looked at issues largely through a security lens instead of a political lens prior to the early 2000s. The securitisation of these issues enforced the idea that the threats were legitimate and required a use of force. Turkey utilized its hard power to ensure the stability of the state when viewing these issues through a security lens.[5] Turkey's security-centered foreign policy not only hurt its relationships with other countries, but it also harmed internal relations including the Turkish government's relationship with the Kurdish people.[28] Turkey looked at the issues of Kurdish Workers' Party-led terrorism and Turkey's Kurdish problem as a singular issue. Since changing its focus, the country looked at each as separate issues, one security and one political. Through its efforts to desecuritise, the Turkish government took power away from the military and placed it in the hands of the civilian population, allowing for more civilian involvement and consensus building to resolve internal conflicts.[5]

The success of Turkey's economy post-economic crisis in 2001 placed Turkey in a better position for increased soft power. The country experienced an average annual growth rate of six percent between 2002 and 2012. Interest rates declined following the global economic crisis of 2008. Unemployment stayed below eight percent. The inflation rate stood at less than four percent. Turkish export volume reached $150 billion. Its economic prosperity as well as its political accomplishments in this time period prompted the economy minister, Zafer Caglayan, to call it "the Turkish miracle."[35]

Beginning in 2002, Prime Minister Erdoğan ushered in top-down modernization within Turkey by embracing democracy, human rights and the rule of law while maintaining the values of Turkish-Islamic culture. This balance allowed Erdoğan to mobilize conservative portions of the population to support Turkey's European Union membership while also establishing closer ties within the Middle East.[28]

External Factors

In addition to these internal factors, external elements aided Turkey's rise in soft power. The pressures of the West manifested in globalization aided Turkey's adoption of soft power. As the West seeped into Turkey through the process of globalization, Turkey became hooked on the idea of being a part of a larger, more interconnected world; yet at the same time, Turkey underwent a process of regionalization.[5] A physical manifestation of this shift towards regionalization is evident in Turkish-language geography and history textbooks used from elementary to university levels. Prior to the 1990s, almost all of the textbooks contained an administrative map of the republic. These textbooks largely lacked maps showing Turkey in a global context. Since the 1990s, this began to change as the textbooks included an additional map. The inclusion of the Turkic World map in textbooks exemplified Turkey's new role as the

heart of the Turkic World, a role rediscovered following the collapse of the Soviet Union.[27] This combination of globalization and regionalization resulted in a multidirectional "glocalization" in which international influences mixed with regional and local customs and practices.[28]

In December 1999 at the EU Helsinki Summit, the EU began the process of accepting Turkey as a candidate country.[36] This action heightened hope within the Middle East that Turkey's admittance to the EU would bring development, modernization, peace and security to the region. Middle Eastern countries expected a more globalized Turkey to usher in an era of change.[5]

However, the EU did not offer Turkey its support with a blank check. It demanded that Turkey's military play a smaller role in the implementation of policy. Based on these demands and Turkey's desperation to be a part of the Western community, Turkey decreased the number of military officers in the National Security Council (NSC), placing more civilians than military personnel on the council. The Council altered its mandate accordingly so that it advises the government on issues of critical concern.[5]

To win the hearts of the West, Turkey adopted a multilateral and cooperative approach to its foreign policy. As the successor to the Ottoman Empire, Turkey played a key role in maintaining the relationship between the East and the West. By contributing to the Western efforts in the Middle East, Turkey not only appealed to the West, but also aided the countries within its region.[5] Turkey projected the European norms of international relations on the Middle East in its efforts to bring stability to the region.[5] By doing this, it placed itself in a win-win situation. Turkey would gain the respect of the West and become a leader in the East.

Not only did Turkey's cooperation with international and regional organizations heighten its soft power, but its direct involvement in these organizations also greatly increased the country's soft power. The 2005 election of Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu as the Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) demonstrated Turkey's commitment to improving relations among Islamic states.[5+37]

In a post-September 11 world, security issues emanating from the Middle East became a major concern for the EU and the United States. The EU realized that its potential acceptance of Turkey into the European Union would be more than a positive gesture, it would show the world there could be peace between the East and the West and that the EU has a secular, value based, multicultural character. At the center of this partnership, Turkey would gain significant soft power. Similarly, as the U.S. fights the "global war on terror," it utilized Turkey's strategic position in the region.[5] These relationships proved to be mutually beneficial for a time.

Instruments

Turkey engaged with political, state and non-state actors in a difficult political environment in the Middle East.[28] In an effort to affect positive change in the Middle East, Turkey encouraged cooperation in Iraq, enacting a holistic approach towards the country's numerous ethnic and political groups. In Syria, Turkey shifted its view away from security and focused on the economic and cultural dimensions of its relationship with Syria. Despite Iran's increasing geopolitical power in the region, Turkey developed an economically beneficial relationship with Iran and facilitated dialogue between Iran and Western states.[5]

Besides engaging with political actors, Turkey outwardly supported democratic processes. Turkey respected the results of popular elections throughout the Middle East, including Lebanon, Palestine, Iran, Iraq and Tunisia. Despite some Western countries' refusal to recognize certain democratically-elected groups like Hamas in Palestine, Turkey respected the democratic process. This respect aided Turkey's relations with the governments of these countries within the Middle East.[28]

Turkey exhibited economic cooperation and integration, a mutually beneficial process, as another instrument of foreign policy.[28] Prime Minister Erdoğan aided this cooperation and integration by traveling to both wealthy Western countries and developing countries in an effort to increase foreign investment and trade relations.[5] As of 2013, Turkey's economy was growing at 4.2 percent while the U.S. battled the effects of the 2008 financial crisis and the EU battled an economic crisis of its own.[24] Direct foreign investment in Turkey's economy rose to more than $120 billion in 2014 from $3.2 billion ten years earlier.[38] Turkish exports, including cultural ones like soap operas, reach unprecedented levels.[24] As Turkey's economy grew, it became an emerging donor country, providing financial and technical aid to projects around the world.[28] Turkey provided humanitarian assistance to its neighbor, Syria, and across the world in countries like Haiti and the Philippines.[24]

Turkey's historical ties to the once vast Ottoman Empire allowed for an increase in sociocultural relations and interpersonal communication in the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East, North Africa and central Asia. Turkey participated in a number of projects including the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency, the Yunus Emre Foundation, the Turkish ministry of culture and tourism and other governmental agencies to preserve the Ottoman-Turkish cultural heritage and encourage interaction between different cultural and social groups.[28] As of 2013, Turkey's tourism industry held strong despite the civil war in Syria.[24] Tourism generated about 600,000 jobs or 2.3 percent of Turkey's total employment. About a million jobs were created in other sectors related to tourism like the restaurants and leisure industries.[39]

Turkey's reach went beyond the former Ottoman territory, Europe and the United States. Turkey utilized both its geographic positioning and its historical and cultural legacy to deepen

its relations with the international community as a whole. It widened its strategic horizon and looked to Africa beginning in 2008. Turkey increased its diplomatic relations and trade with African countries, opened dozens of embassies within these countries, lifted visa restrictions and hosted a number of African summits.[28]

In an effort to demonstrate to the world Turkey's new policies and initiatives, the office of the prime minister established an office of public diplomacy in 2010. Turkey's advancements in soft power would mean little if not shown to the world. The office of public diplomacy allowed Turkey to highlight its partnerships and accomplishments.[28] Seeing Turkey's actions elevated the international community's respect for Turkey, in turn giving Turkey more legitimacy and credibility.

Erdoğan once stated, "All of these [soft power] qualities have transformed Turkey into an attractive place for business, media, artists, diplomats, students and nongovernmental organizations from around the world. Turkey's ever-increasing soft power is becoming one of its most significant traits, which we will continue to use to enhance regional and global peace."[28] Unfortunately, under Erdoğan's continued leadership, Turkey turned back the clock and significantly declined in soft power.

Downturn

Political

Both Turkey's rise and fall in soft power occurred under the guidance of the AKP as the leading political party. Yet, it's the AKP's recent power grabs that have severely threatened the country's legitimacy and credibility. In September 2010, a package of constitutional amendments was approved in a national referendum which made the military more accountable to civilian courts and increased the legislature's power to appoint judges. Opponents accused the AKP of stripping the military and judiciary of their independence.[32] As recently as April 2017, the Turkish electorate voted in favor of several amendments to the constitution in a nationwide referendum by a slim majority, transitioning the government from a parliamentary system to a presidential system.[25+40] President Erdoğan celebrated the referendum's passing when he said, "We are enacting the most important governmental reform of our history."[25] These constitutional amendments are the most dramatic changes to the country's system of governance since its founding. The amendments shift the prime minister's duties to the president and completely eliminate the role of the prime minister. The president will no longer act as the neutral chief of state; he or she can now be head of both his or her party and the government. The president may issue decrees on political, social and economic issues that will carry the force of law. The president may appoint one or more vice presidents, an office never before seen in Turkish government.[41] The president may serve up to two five-year terms but can run for a third term if the parliament cuts short the second term by calling for early elections.[25] The referendum allows for the reduction of parliament's check-and-balance mechanism by stripping it of its

power to oversee the council of ministers. It restricts the members of parliament to only written submissions as part of its auditing process. The parliament will need an absolute majority of its membership if it wishes to re-pass a bill sent back for reconsideration by the president. The amendments also impede the impeachment process by requiring an absolute majority to petition for an investigation into an alleged crime and then three-fifths backing to move forward with the petition. If the parliament is successful in those feats, a report must be composed by a 15-member commission which would then need a two-thirds majority to be sent to the supreme court for a final review. Due to the referendum, he president now selects 18 of the 28 top-ranking members of the judiciary.[41]

Economic

"The Turkish miracle," as described by Turkey's economy minister, became a distant memory as Turkey's economy took a turn for the worst. Turkey's average annual growth rate fell from six to three percent and stayed at three percent between 2012 and 2015. The unemployment soared to double digits. Inflation rose. Regional instability caused Turkish exports to take a hit. Since 2013, the Turkish lira dropped about 70 percent in value, making it one of the weakest currencies against the U.S. dollar.[35]

Tourism and terrorism

Despite Turkey's booming tourism industry in the early 2000s, the increasing threat of violence and terrorism resulted in a 16.5 percent decrease in the first quarter of 2016 when compared to the first quarter of 2015.[24] This decline in tourism cut about one percentage point of Turkey's GDP from the country's growth. Industries such as hotels, restaurants, transportation, telecommunication, retail trade and textiles took the brunt of this economic hit.[38] The jump in terrorist violence began in 2015 with bombings in Ankara, Istanbul and throughout the largely Kurdish southeastern region of the country.[23] Violent unrest within Turkey is not limited to acts of terror.

Failed coup attempt

On July 15, 2016, members of the Turkish Armed Forces attempted to stage a military coup. This attempt resulted in 300 dead and over 2,000 injured.[23] Erdoğan quickly quashed the coup attempt by rallying support within the armed forces and public.[33] Turkish citizens took to the street to halt the coup attempt.[23] Immediately following the coup, the Turkish government arrested or dismissed thousands of military personnel, civil servants, journalists and academics based on accusations of their connection to the attempted coup.[23+33] The Turkish government placed blame on followers of an Islamic transnational religious and social movement for instigating the coup.[23] Erdoğan holds Fethullah Gulen, a Turkish cleric in the United States, responsible for this coup attempt.[33] In response to the acts of terror and coup attempt, the Turkish government took hyper-securitised actions including a roundup of members of the media and political opponents.[22]

Freedoms

Beginning in 2009, Turkey's disrespect for the freedom of the press raised concerns among the international community like the EU and Reporters Without Borders. The Turkish government levied a tax fine of $2.5 billion on Dogan Holding, the largest media conglomerate in Turkey.[36] Turkey's anti-terrorism laws put 9,000 individuals including students, journalists, lawyers and activists in prison. Turkey imprisons more journalists than China or Iran.[33] Turkish authorities closed dozens of media organization and hundreds of nongovernmental organizations.[22] According to Human Rights Watch, the Turkish government has shut down or seized control of more than 150 media companies and jailed at least 144 journalists since the failed coup attempt.[42]

Refugee crisis

When the U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon announced that Turkey would host the first-ever world humanitarian summit in 2013, Turkey held immense soft power. Between 2013 and 2016, Turkey's soft power became unrecognizable. The Syrian crisis caused a severe security predicament for Turkey which resulted in hundreds of dead citizens at the hands of the Islamic State. As of 2013, Turkey hosted 600,000 refugees for which it received high praise. By 2016, Turkey became home to 2.8 million refugees. Turkey's infrastructure is simply unable to support this massive influx of refugees despite spending more than $10 billion in protection and public services for refugees since 2011. Although listed as the country with the largest refugee population in 2014, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees submitted only 15,738 requests for resettlement on Turkey's behalf. The lack of proper assistance by the international community forces the refugees to live in difficult urban conditions where they engage in illegal work, child labor and prostitution. Hundreds of refugees have died trying to cross into Greece from Turkey through the Aegean Sea.[24] This image of squalor and unrest is not reflective of the Turkey of the early 2000s when it reached its peak levels of soft power.

President Erdoğan's consolidation of power, the declining economy, the dramatic drop in tourism due to increased unrest and security threats, the failed military coup attempt, the dramatic government clampdown and the collapse in infrastructure due to a flood of refugees resulted in Turkey's sudden decline in soft power. The government's role in each of these scenarios created international doubt in Turkey's soft power. As Joseph Nye stated, a country derives its legitimacy from the values of the power-holder; its political, social, economic and cultural institutions; and the methods in which its foreign policy is executed. Beginning as early as 2009, Turkey has failed in each of these categories. As the power-holder within Turkey, President Erdoğan does not reflect values of soft power. His desperate grabs for power resemble the creation of an authoritarian regime. Turkey's political institutions continue to restrict Turkey's social and cultural institutions through limitations on their freedom of expression. Security threats placed Turkey's economic system in great danger of failure. Instead of strengthening its foreign policy in times of distress, Turkey chose to collapse inwardly and

focus on its domestic issues. Under President Erdoğan, talks of Turkey joining the EU died.[43] It no longer appears as if Turkey is making an effort to play a larger role in the international community. Turkey lost the legitimacy and credibility it gained in the early 2000s. The international community cannot overlook Turkey's actions as the country turns its back on soft power and prioritizes its hard power.

Future

As President Erdoğan continues to consolidate his own power, he will likely pursue a policy of hard power to remain in control and protect his country from both internal and external security threats. If instability in the Middle East worsens, the Turkish government will likely resort to its hard power resources. Independent media will be eliminated and replaced with state-run sources of news and propaganda. Tourism will continue to decline, taking the entire economy down with it. Foreign investment will cease as Turkey loses credibility. Unemployment will rise, prompting civil unrest only to be countered by a strict and likely violent government crackdown. Civil unrest typically invites other violent groups to take root in unstable communities just as jihadists took advantage of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. The Islamic State has already penetrated Turkey. Civil unrest and political dissent will give jihadist groups like the Islamic State leverage in Turkish communities. The military, which was once entrusted as the guardian of Turkey's ideals, likely will not attempt a military coup so soon after its failure in July 2016.

Resolutions

Turkey's path to regain its soft power requires a two-part plan. Part one calls for improved domestic security. Part two involves regaining the trust of the international community through trade and tourism.

If Turkey wishes to regain some of its soft power, Turkey must address its Syrian policy, specifically the Syrian refugee crisis. Turkey must retain its open-door policy put in place in November 2011 and continue to seek out the assistance of the international community as a whole, not just from the EU and the United States. Turkey must reach out to its neighbors in the Middle East. Turkey's neighbors have a responsibility to assist the Syrian refugees including those within Turkey.[24] In addition to better management of the refugee crisis, Turkey should focus on securing itself against terrorism. As Joseph Nye said, countries must utilize both hard and soft power. Turkey is no exception. Turkey can use its military resources to limit the Islamic State.

Once secure, Turkey must work to regain the trust of the international community. It should begin by stimulating its economy through trade. Once trade brings profit to Turkey, tourism will soon increase. An increase in tourism will benefit a great number of Turkish industries. Tourism will promote cultural exchanges, increasing international interest in Turkey. As interest in Turkey peaks, Turkey will regain some of its former soft power.

Turkey's location makes it invaluable to the international community, just as it did in the early 2000s. Turkey must take back its role as moderator and liaison between the East and the West. Western powers could utilize another strong ally in the region as they continue their fight against the Islamic State. The West needs to present the Middle East with a model state for guidance. Turkey could once again serve as that model if it regains its soft power of the early 2000s.

Conclusion

To be a soft power abundant state, one must possess international legitimacy. Paradoxically, Israel leads the Middle East in soft power while being denied legitimacy by many states in its own region. Further research should be done to determine the soft power practiced by states of the Middle East within the region instead of looking at their soft power on a global scale. The SPME uses global metrics of soft power to determine the ranking of Middle Eastern states in a global context. Determining metrics to measure Middle Eastern states' soft power within the region specifically might reveal different soft power leaders. In such a study, I would expect Israel to fall significantly in the ranking.

However, when looking at overall soft power, Israel handedly leads the Middle East. Israel maintains a level of stability its neighbors largely lack. If the Middle East improved upon its regional cooperation mechanisms, it could see stabilization in various states and an overall increase in each state's soft power.

Regional unification mechanisms like the Arab League have a particularly difficult task, to establish stability in a region of the world that is seemingly entrenched in turmoil. International organizations work to socialize their nation states to act in certain ways acceptable to the international community or adopt values similar to those of the greater international community. Robert Butterworth found the Arab League to have less success in socialization than other international organizations such as the Organization of American States, the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations.[44] Despite efforts to unite around pan-Arabism, the Middle East hosts some of the weakest regional organizations and records of cooperation and coordination.[45]

With regional cooperation comes greater soft power. Global soft power studies like "The Soft Power 30" would see Middle Eastern states break into the top rankings if Middle Eastern states were able to efficiently cooperate with one another.

As nationalist, populist movements take hold of Western powers including the United States and the United Kingdom, the global scale of power shifts in favor of hard power. This trend may discourage other countries from investing in soft power as they see the Western powers focus inward. Alternatively, these shifts may allow other countries to fill the soft power void left by powers like the U.S. and the U.K. Top ranking SPME states have the opportunity to prove their value on the international stage as the U.S. and U.K. withdrawal. The process of globalization will continue despite this period of increased nationalism. The condition of globalization may diminish, but the process will draw the international community back together. A coordinated effort to increase soft power in the Middle East will make the region competitive when the international community once again realizes that international collaboration is indispensable in achieving global success.

Appendix

Methodology

To develop the SPME rankings, I use data from a variety of sources, each categorized into the six sub-indexes. Each sub-index consists of six or more metrics. I base my metrics on those used by McClory in "The Soft Power 30." In a few instances, I was unable to obtain the same information as the Portland team. Some sources did not include data for the majority of the Middle Eastern states; instead, the sources looked only to members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). If sources only offered data for a handful of states, I discarded that metric. In other instances, I found more recent and inclusive studies to use in place of or in addition to those used by the Portland team.

Once I gathered every available data point, I ranked the states one through 23. I found the sum of the metrics for each state and divided the sum by the number of metrics. I then used that number to rank the states one through 23. To find the overall SPME ranking, I took each state's average from the sub-indexes, found the sum and divided that by six. I then used that final number to rank the states.

When states lacked one or two metrics, I noted the missing data and developed the average ranking of the state in that sub-index by dividing by the number of metrics for which there was data available. When states lacked three or more metrics, I excluded them from the sub-index ranking. If a state was excluded from more than one sub-index, I excluded that state from the overall soft power ranking as well.

Metrics

I include the metrics for each sub-index and list the countries according to their soft power within each metric.

Culture

	Arrival of non-resident tourists at national borders/inbound tourists - The World Tourism Organization (2015)
Turkey	39,478,374
Saudi Arabia	17,994,229
Bahrain	11,621,336
Morocco	10,176,762
Egypt	9,327,804
Kuwait	6,940,697
Tunisia	5,359,000
Iran	5,236,909
Jordan	3,761,069
Qatar	2,930,000
Israel	2,799,346
Cyprus	2,780,000
Oman	2,619,000
Palestine	2,339,000
Algeria	1,709,994
Lebanon	1,517,927
Yemen	366,692

	Inbound tourism total expenditure - The World Tourism Organization (Million US$)
Turkey	35,413 (2015)
Qatar	12,131 (2015)
Saudi Arabia	11,183 (2015)
Morocco	7,534 (2015)
Lebanon	7,087 (2015)
Egypt	6,897 (2015)
Israel	6,061 (2015)
Jordan	4,997 (2015)
Iran	3,676 (2014)
Cyprus	2,489 (2015)
Oman	2,247 (2015)
Bahrain	1,915 (2014)
Tunisia	1,381 (2015)
Kuwait	931 (2015)
Pakistan	929 (2013)
Palestine	478 (2015)
Algeria	357 (2015)

	Travel and tourism competitiveness index - World Economic Forum (2017)
United Arab Emirates	4.49
Turkey	4.14
Qatar	4.08
Cyprus	4.02
Bahrain	3.89
Israel	3.84
Saudi Arabia	3.82
Morocco	3.81
Oman	3.78
Egypt	3.64
Jordan	3.63
Tunisia	3.50
Iran	3.43
Lebanon	3.37
Kuwait	3.33
Algeria	3.07
Pakistan	2.89
Yemen	2.44

	Number of films appearing in 5 major international film festivals - Sundance, Venice Film Festival, Toronto International Film Festival, Cannes Festival, Berlin International Film Festival
Qatar	23
Israel	18
Lebanon	17
Iran	13
Morocco	13
Palestine	9
Egypt	5
Algeria	4
Syria	3
Tunisia	2
Turkey	2
Afghanistan	1
Bahrain	1
Iraq	1
Jordan	1
Kuwait	1
Oman	1
Pakistan	1
United Arab Emirates	1
Cyprus	0
Libya	0
Saudi Arabia	0
Yemen	0

	Number of UNESCO World Heritage sites - UNESCO
Iran	19
Turkey	16
Israel	9
Morocco	9
Tunisia	8
Algeria	7
Egypt	7
Pakistan	6
Syria	6 although all have been significantly damaged or destroyed[46]
Iraq	5
Jordan	5
Lebanon	5
Libya	5
Oman	4
Saudi Arabia	4
Yemen	4
Cyprus	3
Palestine	3
Afghanistan	2
Bahrain	2
Qatar	1
United Arab Emirates	1
Kuwait	0

	Power Language Index score - Kai L. Chan
Algeria	5 Arabic
Bahrain	5 Arabic
Egypt	5 Arabic
Iraq	5 Arabic
Jordan	5 Arabic
Kuwait	5 Arabic
Lebanon	5 Arabic
Libya	5 Arabic
Morocco	5 Arabic
Oman	5 Arabic
Palestine	5 Arabic
Qatar	5 Arabic
Saudi Arabia	5 Arabic
Tunisia	5 Arabic
United Arab Emirates	5 Arabic
Yemen	5 Arabic
Turkey	18 Turkish
Afghanistan	29 Persian
Iran	29 Persian
Israel	32 Hebrew
Cyprus	40 Greek
Pakistan	54 Punjabi

	Number of Olympic medals won in the summer 2016 Olympics - the International Olympic Committee
Iran	8
Turkey	8
Egypt	3
Tunisia	3
Algeria	2
Bahrain	2
Israel	2
Jordan	1
Morocco	1
Qatar	1
United Arab Emirates	1
Afghanistan	0
Cyprus	0
Iraq	0
Kuwait	0
Lebanon	0
Libya	0
Oman	0
Palestine	0
Pakistan	0
Saudi Arabia	0
Syria	0

	Men's FIFA ranking as of August 10, 2017 - FIFA
Iran	24
Egypt	25
Turkey	33
Tunisia	34
Algeria	48
Saudi Arabia	59
Morocco	60
Israel	70
United Arab Emirates	74
Qatar	78
Syria	80
Libya	83
Palestine	93
Cyprus	94
Iraq	102
Jordan	108
Oman	120
Bahrain	124
Lebanon	125
Yemen	146
Afghanistan	156
Kuwait	174
Pakistan	200

	Quality of national air-carrier based on customer reviews - Skytrax
Qatar	8
Lebanon	7
Oman	7
Afghanistan	6
Bahrain	6
Egypt	6
Iran	6
Jordan	6
Turkey	6
Saudi Arabia	6
Algeria	5
Israel	5
Kuwait	5
Pakistan	5
Tunisia	5
United Arab Emirates	5
Libya	4
Morocco	4
Yemen	4
Syria	3

Government

	Human Development Index score -United Nations (2015)
Israel	0.899
Cyprus	0.856
Qatar	0.856
Saudi Arabia	0.847
United Arab Emirates	0.840
Bahrain	0.824
Kuwait	0.800
Oman	0.796
Iran	0.774
Turkey	0.767
Lebanon	0.763
Algeria	0.745
Jordan	0.742
Tunisia	0.725
Libya	0.716
Egypt	0.691
Palestine	0.684
Iraq	0.649
Morocco	0.647
Pakistan	0.550
Syria	0.536
Yemen	0.482
Afghanistan	0.479

	Freedom House Index aggregate score (2017)
Cyprus	94
Israel	80
Tunisia	78
Lebanon	44
Pakistan	43
Morocco	41
Turkey	38
Jordan	37
Kuwait	36
Algeria	35
Iraq	27
Egypt	26
Qatar	26
Oman	25
Afghanistan	24
Palestine	20 (average of West Bank and Gaza Strip)
United Arab Emirates	20
Iran	17
Yemen	14
Libya	13
Bahrain	12
Saudi Arabia	10
Syria	-1

	Number of think tanks in country (2015) - James G. McGann
Iran	59
Israel	58
Egypt	35
Turkey	32
Iraq	31
Palestine	28
Yemen	22
Jordan	21
Pakistan	20
Lebanon	19
Tunisia	18
Morocco	15
Kuwait	14
Algeria	9
Qatar	7
United Arab Emirates	7
Afghanistan	6
Cyprus	6
Syria	6
Bahrain	4
Saudi Arabia	4
Oman	3
Libya	2

	Global Gender Gap Index score - World Economic Forum (2016)
Israel	0.719
Cyprus	0.684
Qatar	0.643
Algeria	0.642
United Arab Emirates	0.639
Tunisia	0.636
Kuwait	0.624
Turkey	0.623
Bahrain	0.615
Egypt	0.614
Oman	0.612
Jordan	0.603
Lebanon	0.598
Morocco	0.597
Iran	0.587
Saudi Arabia	0.583
Syria	0.567
Pakistan	0.556
Yemen	0.516

	Economist Democracy Index score - *The Economist* (2016)
Israel	7.85
Cyprus	7.65
Tunisia	6.40
Turkey	5.04
Lebanon	4.86
Morocco	4.77
Palestine	4.49
Pakistan	4.33
Iraq	4.08
Jordan	3.96
Kuwait	3.85
Algeria	3.56
Egypt	3.31
Qatar	3.18
Oman	3.04
Bahrain	2.79
United Arab Emirates	2.75
Afghanistan	2.55
Iran	2.34
Libya	2.25
Yemen	2.07
Saudi Arabia	1.93
Syria	1.43

	Voice and Accountability Index score - World Bank (2016)
Cyprus	1.08
Israel	0.77
Tunisia	0.33
Lebanon	-0.52
Turkey	-0.63
Morocco	-0.65
Kuwait	-0.69
Pakistan	-0.69
Jordan	-0.76
Algeria	-0.88
Iraq	-1.01
Afghanistan	-1.09
Oman	-1.11
United Arab Emirates	-1.12
Palestine	-1.17
Qatar	-1.20
Egypt	-1.23
Libya	-1.37
Iran	-1.39
Bahrain	-1.45
Yemen	-1.65
Saudi Arabia	-1.78
Syria	-1.96

	Government Effectiveness score - World Bank (2016)
United Arab Emirates	1.41
Israel	1.35
Cyprus	0.98
Qatar	0.75
Bahrain	0.32
Saudi Arabia	0.24
Oman	0.19
Jordan	0.14
Turkey	0.05
Morocco	-0.10
Kuwait	-0.18
Iran	-0.20
Tunisia	-0.21
Lebanon	-0.53
Algeria	-0.54
Palestine	-0.62
Pakistan	-0.64
Egypt	-0.66
Afghanistan	-1.22
Iraq	-1.26
Syria	-1.82
Yemen	-1.82
Libya	-1.89

	Regulatory Quality score - World Bank (2016)
Israel	1.31
Cyprus	1.05
United Arab Emirates	0.97
Qatar	0.70
Bahrain	0.61
Oman	0.61
Turkey	0.20
Saudi Arabia	0.08
Palestine	0.06
Jordan	0.05
Kuwait	-0.07
Morocco	-0.23
Lebanon	-0.34
Tunisia	-0.47
Pakistan	-0.64
Egypt	-0.92
Iraq	-1.13
Algeria	-1.17
Iran	-1.23
Afghanistan	-1.33
Yemen	-1.48
Syria	-1.67
Libya	-2.27

	Rule of Law score - World Bank (2016)
Israel	1.02
United Arab Emirates	0.89
Qatar	0.86
Cyprus	0.73
Saudi Arabia	0.47
Bahrain	0.46
Oman	0.43
Jordan	0.31
Kuwait	0.03
Tunisia	0.02
Morocco	-0.14
Turkey	-0.16
Palestine	-0.31
Egypt	-0.41
Iran	-0.71
Pakistan	-0.83
Algeria	-0.85
Lebanon	-0.86
Yemen	-1.60
Afghanistan	-1.62
Iraq	-1.70
Libya	-1.87
Syria	-2.01

	Recorded executions - Amnesty International
Algeria	0 (2016)
Cyprus	0 (2016)
Israel	0 (2016)
Jordan	0 (2016)
Lebanon	0 (2016)
Morocco	0 (2016)
Oman	0 (2016)
Qatar	0 (2016)
Tunisia	0 (2016)
Turkey	0 (2016)
United Arab Emirates	0 (2016)
Bahrain	3 (2017)
Palestine	3 (2016)
Afghanistan	6 (2016)
Kuwait	7 (2017)
Egypt	44+ (2016)
Pakistan	87+ (2016)
Iraq	88+ (2016)
Saudi Arabia	154+ (2016)
Iran	567+ (2016)

	World Press Freedom Index score - Reporters Without Borders (2017)
Cyprus	19.79
Israel	31.01
Tunisia	32.22
Lebanon	33.01
Kuwait	39.61
United Arab Emirates	39.39
Afghanistan	39.46
Qatar	39.83
Oman	40.46
Morocco	42.42
Algeria	42.83
Palestine	42.90
Jordan	43.24
Pakistan	43.55
Turkey	52.98
Iraq	54.03
Egypt	55.78
Libya	56.81
Bahrain	58.88
Iran	65.12
Yemen	65.80
Saudi Arabia	66.02
Syria	81.49

Education

	TIMSS eighth grade mathematics scores - TIMSS & PIRLS International Study Center (2015)
Israel	511
United Arab Emirates	465
Turkey	458
Bahrain	454
Lebanon	442
Qatar	437
Iran	436
Oman	403
Egypt	392
Kuwait	392
Jordan	386
Morocco	384
Saudi Arabia	368

	TIMSS eighth grade science scores - TIMSS & PIRLS International Study Center (2015)
Israel	507
Turkey	493
United Arab Emirates	477
Bahrain	466
Qatar	457
Iran	456
Oman	455
Jordan	426
Kuwait	411
Lebanon	398
Saudi Arabia	396
Morocco	393
Egypt	371

	Gross enrollment ratio, tertiary, both sexes (%) - World Bank
Turkey	94.7 (2015)
Iran	71.9 (2015)
Israel	64.7 (2015)
Saudi Arabia	63.1 (2015)
Cyprus	60.1 (2015)
Jordan	44.9 (2015)
Palestine	44.3 (2015)
Syria	44.0 (2015)
Bahrain	43.3 (2015)
Lebanon	38.5 (2015)
Algeria	36.9 (2015)
Egypt	36.2 (2015)
Tunisia	34.6 (2015)
Morocco	28.1 (2015)
Kuwait	27.0 (2013)
Qatar	14.5 (2015)
Pakistan	9.9 (2015)
Afghanistan	8.7 (2014)

	Highest ranked university - QS World University Rankings (2018)
Israel	145
Saudi Arabia	173
Lebanon	235
Qatar	349
United Arab Emirates	390
Egypt	395
Bahrain	411
Turkey	421
Pakistan	431
Oman	451
Iran	471
Iraq	501
Jordan	551
Kuwait	651
Morocco	801
Palestine	801

	Number of scientific and technical journal articles published - World Bank (2013)
Iran	32,964.8
Turkey	30,402.3
Israel	11,300.2
Egypt	9,199.2
Pakistan	7,771.5
Saudi Arabia	7,635.6
Tunisia	4,206.8
Algeria	3.652.5
Morocco	2,536.4
United Arab Emirates	1,679.1
Jordan	1,504.3
Lebanon	1,050.3
Iraq	946.5
Cyprus	888.6
Kuwait	843.8
Qatar	770.2
Oman	657.6
Syria	310.5
Libya	231.4
Bahrain	209.7
Yemen	127.1
Palestine	125.8
Afghanistan	26.5

	Total inbound internationally mobile students - UNESCO
United Arab Emirates	73,445 (2015)
Saudi Arabia	73,077 (2015)
Turkey	72,178 (2015)
Egypt	47,815 (2014)
Jordan	40,378 (2015)
Lebanon	21,332 (2015)
Morocco	14,220 (2014)
Iran	13,767 (2015)
Qatar	10,509 (2015)
Israel	10,471 (2014)
Algeria	7,967 (2015)
Cyprus	6,526 (2015)
Tunisia	6,442 (2015)
Bahrain	5,397 (2015)
Oman	3,571 (2013)

	Government expenditure on education, total (% of GDP) - World Bank
Cyprus	6.1 (2014)
Israel	5.8 (2014)
Oman	5.0 (2013)
Turkey	4.8 (2013)
Qatar	3.6 (2014)
Afghanistan	3.3 (2015)
Iran	2.9 (2015)
Bahrain	2.7 (2015)
Lebanon	2.6 (2013)
Pakistan	2.6 (2015)
Palestine	1.3 (2015)

Enterprise

	Global Competitiveness Index score - World Economic Forum (2017-2018)
Israel	5.31
United Arab Emirates	5.30
Qatar	5.11
Saudi Arabia	4.83
Bahrain	4.54
Kuwait	4.43
Turkey	4.42
Oman	4.31
Cyprus	4.30
Jordan	4.30
Iran	4.27
Morocco	4.24
Algeria	4.07
Tunisia	3.93
Egypt	3.90
Lebanon	3.84
Pakistan	3.67
Yemen	2.87

	Foreign direct investment inflows (% of GDP) - UNCTAD (2016)
Cyprus	21.18
Lebanon	5.09
Jordan	4.04
Israel	3.98
Egypt	2.85
Tunisia	2.41
United Arab Emirates	2.34
Morocco	2.25
Turkey	1.69
Libya	1.47
Saudi Arabia	1.08
Algeria	0.93
Bahrain	0.86
Iran	0.80
Pakistan	0.70
Afghanistan	0.53
Qatar	0.44
Kuwait	0.23
Oman	0.20
Yemen	-1.75
Iraq	-3.56

	Foreign direct investment outflows (% of GDP) - UNCTAD (2016)
Cyprus	27.52
Qatar	4.54
United Arab Emirates	4.09
Israel	4.04
Lebanon	1.54
Saudi Arabia	1.21
Oman	1.20
Libya	1.02
Morocco	0.62
Bahrain	0.52
Turkey	0.40
Iraq	0.18
Yemen	0.11
Tunisia	0.09
Egypt	0.07
Algeria	0.03
Iran	0.02
Pakistan	0.02
Jordan	0.01
Afghanistan	0.00
Kuwait	-5.22

	Economic Freedom Index score - The Heritage Foundation		Corruption Perceptions Index score - Transparency International (2016)
United Arab Emirates	76.9 (2017)	United Arab Emirates	66
Qatar	73.1 (2017)	Israel	64
Israel	69.7 (2017)	Qatar	61
Bahrain	68.5 (2017)	Cyprus	55
Cyprus	67.9 (2017)	Jordan	48
Jordan	66.7 (2017)	Saudi Arabia	46
Turkey	65.2 (2017)	Oman	45
Kuwait	65.1 (2017)	Bahrain	43
Saudi Arabia	64.4 (2017)	Kuwait	41
Oman	62.1 (2017)	Tunisia	41
Morocco	61.5 (2017)	Turkey	41
Tunisia	55.7 (2017)	Morocco	37
Yemen	53.7 (2015)	Algeria	34
Lebanon	53.5 (2017)	Egypt	34
Pakistan	52.8 (2017)	Pakistan	32
Egypt	52.6 (2017)	Iran	29
Iran	50.5 (2017)	Lebanon	28
Afghanistan	48.9 (2017)	Iraq	17
Algeria	46.5 (2017)	Afghanistan	15
		Libya	14
		Yemen	14
		Syria	13

	Research and development expenditure (% of GDP) - World Bank
Israel	4.3 (2015)
Turkey	1.0 (2014)
United Arab Emirates	0.9 (2015)
Saudi Arabia	0.8 (2013)
Egypt	0.7 (2015)
Tunisia	0.6 (2015)
Cyprus	0.5 (2015)
Palestine	0.5 (2013)
Kuwait	0.3 (2013)
Oman	0.2 (2015)
Pakistan	0.2 (2015)
Bahrain	0.1 (2014)
Iraq	0.0 (2015)

	Global Innovation Index score (2017)
Israel	53.9
Cyprus	46.8
United Arab Emirates	43.2
Turkey	38.9
Qatar	37.9
Saudi Arabia	36.2
Kuwait	36.1
Bahrain	34.7
Morocco	32.7
Tunisia	32.3
Iran	32.1
Oman	31.8
Lebanon	30.6
Jordan	30.5
Egypt	26.0
Algeria	24.3
Pakistan	23.8
Yemen	15.6

	Ease of Doing Business Index ranking - World Bank (2016)
United Arab Emirates	26
Cyprus	45
Israel	52
Bahrain	63
Oman	66
Morocco	68
Turkey	69
Tunisia	77
Qatar	83
Saudi Arabia	94
Kuwait	102
Jordan	118
Iran	120
Egypt	122
Lebanon	126
Palestine	140
Pakistan	144
Algeria	156
Iraq	165
Syria	173
Yemen	179
Afghanistan	183
Libya	188

	Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (modeled ILO estimate) - World Bank (2016)
Qatar	0.2
Bahrain	1.3
Kuwait	2.4
United Arab Emirates	3.7
Saudi Arabia	5.5
Israel	5.6
Pakistan	5.9
Lebanon	6.8
Afghanistan	8.5
Morocco	10.0
Turkey	10.3
Algeria	11.2
Iran	11.3
Cyprus	11.7
Egypt	12.0
Jordan	13.2
Syria	14.3
Tunisia	14.8
Iraq	16.0
Yemen	17.1
Oman	17.5
Libya	19.2
Palestine	24.9

	Hi-technology exports (% of manufactured exports) - World Bank
Israel	19.7 (2015)
United Arab Emirates	8.5 (2014)
Tunisia	6.3 (2015)
Cyprus	6.2 (2015)
Yemen	4.7 (2015)
Oman	4.1 (2015)
Morocco	3.5 (2015)
Qatar	3.4 (2015)
Kuwait	2.7 (2015)
Lebanon	2.1 (2014)
Turkey	2.0 (2016)
Jordan	1.8 (2015)
Pakistan	1.6 (2015)
Bahrain	1.0 (2015)
Egypt	0.8 (2015)
Palestine	0.8 (2015)
Saudi Arabia	0.8 (2015)
Algeria	0.2 (2015)

	Cost of business state-up procedures (% of GNI per capita) - World Bank (2016)
Iran	1.1
Bahrain	1.2
Kuwait	2.8
Israel	3.3
Oman	4.0
Saudi Arabia	4.1
Tunisia	4.7
Qatar	6.2
Egypt	7.4
Morocco	7.9
Syria	8.9
Algeria	11.1
Cyprus	12.2
Pakistan	12.4
United Arab Emirates	13.0
Turkey	16.4
Afghanistan	19.9
Jordan	22.4
Libya	31.2
Lebanon	40.6
Palestine	46.9
Iraq	51.9
Yemen	82.2

	Human Capital Index score - World Economic Forum (2016)
Israel	78.99
Cyprus	76.97
Bahrain	72.69
Qatar	68.64
United Arab Emirates	68.25
Turkey	67.57
Jordan	64.70
Iran	64.16
Egypt	63.72
Saudi Arabia	63.69
Kuwait	60.27
Morocco	59.65
Tunisia	58.24
Algeria	53.22
Pakistan	53.1
Yemen	42.98

Engagement

	Net official development assistance and official aid received (current US$) - World Bank (2015)
Algeria	88,250,000
Iran	111,260,000
Libya	157,610,000
Tunisia	474,550,000
Lebanon	975,170,000
Morocco	1,368,860,000
Iraq	1,485,030,000
Yemen	1,531,430,000
Palestine	1,873,150,000
Turkey	2,144,760,000
Jordan	2,150,000,000
Egypt	2,487,700,000
Pakistan	3,790,440,000
Afghanistan	4,239,180,000
Syria	4,881,890,000

	Number of embassies abroad - EmbassyPages.com (2017)
Turkey	136
Egypt	127
Libya	114
Iran	106
Qatar	100
Saudi Arabia	98
Algeria	93
Morocco	91
Kuwait	87
Pakistan	86
United Arab Emirates	86
Israel	79
Palestine	76
Iraq	72
Lebanon	70
Tunisia	59
Syria	58
Jordan	50
Oman	48
Yemen	47
Afghanistan	44
Cyprus	42
Bahrain	26

	Number of embassies in a country's capital - EmbassyPages.com (2017)
Egypt	139
Turkey	127
Saudi Arabia	112
United Arab Emirates	111
Kuwait	107
Iran	101
Qatar	99
Algeria	92
Morocco	92
Israel	86
Pakistan	79
Libya	77
Jordan	67
Lebanon	67
Syria	64
Tunisia	63
Iraq	55
Oman	51
Cyprus	42
Yemen	40
Bahrain	38
Afghanistan	34
Palestine	0

	Number of consulates abroad - EmbassyPages.com (2017)
Turkey	182
Cyprus	129
Morocco	120
Israel	97
Pakistan	76
Tunisia	70
Lebanon	62
Jordan	50
Syria	46
Algeria	34
Iran	33
Egypt	29
Oman	29
Yemen	24
United Arab Emirates	20
Afghanistan	19
Saudi Arabia	19
Iraq	15
Kuwait	13
Bahrain	11
Qatar	11
Libya	9
Palestine	3

	International organization participation - The World Factbook
Turkey	73
Egypt	68
Jordan	63
Pakistan	62
Morocco	61
Tunisia	60
Algeria	59
Cyprus	55
Saudi Arabia	55
Kuwait	54
Qatar	54
Yemen	54
Iran	53
Libya	53
United Arab Emirates	52
Afghanistan	50
Israel	50
Bahrain	49
Lebanon	49
Iraq	47
Syria	46
Oman	43

	Status of the Paris Agreement - United Nations
Algeria	Entry into force
Afghanistan	Entry into force
Bahrain	Entry into force
Cyprus	Entry into force
Egypt	Entry into force
Israel	Entry into force
Jordan	Entry into force
Palestine	Entry into force
Pakistan	Entry into force
Morocco	Entry into force
Qatar	Entry into force
Saudi Arabia	Entry into force
Tunisia	Entry into force
Qatar	Entry into force
United Arab Emirates	Entry into force
Syria	Entry into force
Iran	Signed
Iraq	Signed
Kuwait	Signed
Lebanon	Signed
Libya	Signed
Turkey	Signed
Yemen	Signed

	Refugee population by country or territory of origin - World Bank
Cyprus	4 (2015)
Oman	20 (2016)
Qatar	20 (2016)
United Arab Emirates	103 (2016)
Bahrain	446 (2016)
Israel	467 (2016)
Saudi Arabia	897 (2016)
Kuwait	1,008 (2016)
Tunisia	1,667 (2016)
Jordan	1,889 (2016)
Morocco	2,230 (2016)
Algeria	3,675 (2016)
Lebanon	4,709 (2016)
Libya	8,796 (2016)
Yemen	18,396 (2016)
Egypt	19,742 (2016)
Turkey	57,885 (2016)
Iran	94,042 (2016)
Palestine	97,749 (2016)
Pakistan	105,376 (2016)
Iraq	315,998 (2016)
Afghanistan	2,501,410 (2016)
Syria	5,524,333 (2016)

	Number of countries a citizen can visit visa-free - *Henley & Partners* (2016)
Cyprus	159
Israel	147
United Arab Emirates	122
Turkey	102
Kuwait	82
Qatar	79
Bahrain	73
Oman	71
Saudi Arabia	69
Tunisia	65
Morocco	59
Egypt	49
Algeria	48
Jordan	47
Lebanon	39
Yemen	38
Iran	37
Palestine	37
Libya	36
Syria	32
Iraq	30
Pakistan	29
Afghanistan	25

Digital

	Percentage of individuals using the internet - International Telecommunication Union (2016)
Bahrain	93.48
Qatar	92.88
United Arab Emirates	91.24
Kuwait	82.08
Israel	78.89
Oman	74.17
Lebanon	74.00
Cyprus	71.72
Saudi Arabia	69.62
Palestine	57.42
Morocco	57.08
Turkey	53.74
Jordan	53.40
Tunisia	48.52
Iran	44.08
Algeria	38.20
Egypt	35.90
Syria	29.98
Yemen	25.10
Pakistan	18.00
Afghanistan	8.26

	Secure internet servers (per 1 million people) - World Bank (2016)
Cyprus	761
United Arab Emirates	391
Israel	293
Qatar	269
Kuwait	235
Bahrain	196
Oman	96
Turkey	80
Saudi Arabia	58
Lebanon	49
Jordan	24
Iran	14
Tunisia	13
Palestine	10
Morocco	7
Egypt	5
Algeria	4
Libya	4
Pakistan	3
Iraq	2
Afghanistan	1
Syria	1
Yemen	1

	Mobile-cellular telephone subscriptions (per 100 inhabitants) - International Telecommunication Union (2016)
Kuwait	231.76
United Arab Emirates	187.35
Bahrain	185.26
Jordan	179.43
Saudi Arabia	176.59
Oman	159.86
Qatar	153.59
Israel	133.47
Tunisia	129.93
Morocco	126.87
Algeria	113.03
Egypt	110.99
Turkey	96.02
Cyprus	95.40
Iran	93.38
Lebanon	87.07
Palestine	77.62
Yemen	67.98
Pakistan	66.92
Syria	62.45
Afghanistan	61.58

	International internet bandwidth (per internet user) (Bit/s) - International Telecommunication Union (2016)
United Arab Emirates	107,904.40
Cyprus	89,791.16
Israel	89,638.24
Saudi Arabia	88,669.13
Qatar	71,565.87
Oman	59,783.71
Turkey	59,034.36
Kuwait	48,619.24
Bahrain	47,205.11
Tunisia	33,811.97
Algeria	30,119.22
Jordan	27,523.83
Lebanon	27,275.05
Morocco	18,316.34
Palestine	13,399.08
Pakistan	11,907.34
Egypt	11,317.77
Afghanistan	10,212.72
Iran	8,502.16
Syria	3,146.07
Yemen	2,496.42

	E-Government Development Index score - United Nations (2016)
Israel	0.7806
Bahrain	0.7734
United Arab Emirates	0.7515
Kuwait	0.7080
Saudi Arabia	0.6822
Qatar	0.6699
Cyprus	0.6023
Oman	0.5962
Turkey	0.5900
Tunisia	0.5682
Lebanon	0.5646
Morocco	0.5186
Jordan	0.5123
Iran	0.4649
Egypt	0.4594
Libya	0.4322
Syria	0.3404
Iraq	0.3334
Algeria	0.2999
Pakistan	0.2583
Afghanistan	0.2313
Yemen	0.2248

	E-Participation Index score - United Nations (2016)
Israel	0.8305
Morocco	0.8305
Bahrain	0.7458
United Arab Emirates	0.7458
Saudi Arabia	0.7119
Tunisia	0.6949
Kuwait	0.6441
Qatar	0.6441
Turkey	0.6271
Oman	0.5593
Cyprus	0.5254
Lebanon	0.4915
Jordan	0.4576
Syria	0.4576
Afghanistan	0.4237
Iraq	0.4237
Egypt	0.4068
Pakistan	0.3729
Iran	0.2034
Yemen	0.1356
Algeria	0.1186
Libya	0.1017

	Fixed (wired)-broadband subscriptions (per 100 people) - International Telecommunication Union (2016)
Israel	27.44
Lebanon	22.76
Cyprus	22.38
Bahrain	18.61
United Arab Emirates	12.81
Turkey	12.39
Saudi Arabia	12.01
Iran	10.86
Qatar	10.06
Palestine	6.03
Oman	5.61
Algeria	5.57
Egypt	4.52
Tunisia	4.34
Jordan	4.16
Morocco	3.38
Syria	3.14
Yemen	1.55
Kuwait	1.37
Pakistan	0.95
Afghanistan	0.00

References

1. Steger, M. (2013). Globalization: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press.

2. Nye, J. (2009). Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 4, pp. 160-163.

3. McClory, J. (2016). The Soft Power 30: A Global Ranking of Soft Power. Portland.

4. Nye, J. (2008). Public Diplomacy and Soft Power. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 616, 94-109.

5. Oğuzlu, T. (2007). Soft power in Turkish foreign policy. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 61(1).

6. Peters, J., & Peter Simonson. (2004). Mass Communication and American Social Thought: Key Texts, 1919-1968. Rowman & Littlefield.

7. Davison, R. (1960). Where Is the Middle East? Foreign Affairs, Vol. 38, No. 4, pp. 665-675.

8. Jalbout, M. (2015). How can the Middle East close its education gap? World Economic Forum.

9. Livingston, I. (2017). Experts discuss the challenges--and potential solutions--ahead in the Middle East and North Africa. Brookings.

10. McClory, J. (2017). The Soft Power 30: A Global Ranking of Soft Power. Portland.

11. World Economic Forum. (2017). The Travel & Tourism Competitiveness Report 2017.

12. The World Bank. Economy Rankings. Web.

13. World Tourism Organization. (2016). Compendium of Tourism Statistics dataset. UNWTO. Web.

14. McGann, J. (2017, January 26). 2016 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report.

15. McGann, J. & R. Kent Weaver. (2017). Think Tanks & Civil Societies: Catalysts and Ideas for Action. Routledge.

16. UNESCO Institute for Statistics. Total inbound internationally mobile students. UNESCO. Web.

17. Walt, V. (2016). Iran's Startup Spring. Fortune.

18. The World Bank. World Development Indicators. Web.

19. United Nations. Sustainable Development Goals. Web.

20. United Nations. UN E-Government Knowledge Database. Web.

21. Yerkes, S. (2016). Why Morocco's protests won't usher in another Arab Spring. Brookings.

22. Malsin, J. (2017, January 6). A Relentless Cycle of Terror Threatens to Tear Turkey Apart. TIME.

23. CIA. (2017, January 12). The World Factbook: Turkey.

24. Kirişci, K. (2016). Can Turkey salvage its soft power image ahead of the World Humanitarian Summit? Brookings.

25. Kingsley, P. (2017, April 16). Erdogan Claims Vast Powers in Turkey After Narrow Victory in Referendum. The New York Times.

26. BBC. (2017, March 7). Turkey country profile. Web.

27. Evered, K. (2005, July). Regionalism in the Middle East and the Case of Turkey. Geographical Review, Vol. 95, No. 3, New Geographies of the Middle East.

28. Kalin, I. (2012). Turkish foreign policy: Framework, values, and mechanisms. International Journal, 67(1), 7-21.

29. Akyol, M. (2013, April 4). Introducing Post-Kemalist Turkey. Al-Monitor.

30. Harris, G. (1965). The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics. The Middle East Journal. Vol. 19, No. 1, pp 54-66.

31. Cook, S. (2010, March 1). The Weakening of Turkey's Military. Council on Foreign Relations.

32. Encyclopedia Britannica. Justice and Development Party. Web.

33. Karaveli, H. (2016). Erdogan's Journey. Foreign Affairs, 95(6), 121-131.

34. Ciftci, S. & Tezcür, G. (2016). Soft Power, Religion, and Anti-Americanism in the Middle East. Foreign Policy Anal 2016. 12(3), 374-394.

35. Karakaya, K. (2016, February 8). Is this the end of Turkish miracle? Al-Monitor.

36. Koprulu, K. (2009). Paradigm Shift in Turkey's Foreign Policy. The Brown Journal of World Affairs, 16(1), 185-201.

37. Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). General Secretariat. Web.

38. Taheri, A. (2014). The Turkish Roller-Coaster. American Foreign Policy Interests, 36(2), 138-147.

39. International Monetary Fund (IMF). (2017, February 23). Turkey's Economy Hit By Declining Tourism. Web.

40. Friedman, U. (2017, April 17). Turkey's Referendum: How Democracies Decline. The Atlantic.

41. Ekim, S. & Kirişci, K. (2017). The Turkish constitutional referendum, explained. Brookings.

42. Erickson, A. (2017, January 12). Amid Turkey's media crackdown, Erdogan praises Trump for putting CNN reporter 'in his place'. The Washington Post.

43. Emmott, R. (2017, May 2). Turkey's EU dream is over, for now, top official says. Reuters.

44. Archer, C. (2015). International Organizations. New York: Routledge.

45. Karns, M., and Karen A. Mingst. (2010). International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

46. Henderson, E. (2016, March 16). Syria's six Unesco World Heritage Sites all damaged or destroyed during civil war. Independent.

All photos used in this publication beside the headshot were captured by Savanah Dickinson while traveling in the Middle East.